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 ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines underlying factors that could explain the decline in income inequality in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2008 and inquires whether the decline indicates that the 
PRC’s income inequality has peaked following the Kuznets hypothesis. The paper first identifies four 
key drivers of rising income inequality in the PRC since the mid-1980s: rising skill premium, declining 
share of labor income, increasing spatial inequality, and widening inequality in the distribution of 
wealth. It then provides evidence that the reversal of these drivers, with the exception of wealth 
inequality, could partly explain the decline in income inequality since 2008. The paper argues that 
since part of the reversal of these drivers is policy induced, it is important that the policy actions 
continue for income inequality to decline further. The paper further argues that a critical factor 
underlying the Kuznets hypothesis is that taxation and transfers play a bigger role in income 
redistribution as a country becomes more developed, while their role is still limited in the PRC, the 
future path of the country’s income inequality may not be one directional; and reducing income 
inequality significantly may require personal income tax and transfers to play a greater role over time. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: income inequality, Kuznets hypothesis, the PRC economy 
 
JEL codes: D31, D63, N35 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Rapidly rising income inequality in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since economic reform 
started in the late 1970s has attracted considerable attention by policy makers and researchers in and 
outside the country in recent years (Li, Wan, and Zhuang 2014). While the Chinese economy has 
managed to grow at close to 10% annually for more than 3 decades, and the growth has helped lift 
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, the Chinese society has in the process become less 
equal. The Gini coefficient of per capita household disposable income was below 30 in the early 1980s 
(Ravallion and Chen 2007).1  In 2015, according to the estimate of China National Bureau of Statistics 
(CNBS), it stood at 46.2 (CNBS 2016). This is a high level compared with many countries in Asia (ADB 
2012).  
 
However, in more recent years, the PRC’s Gini coefficient has been on the decline. According 
to the estimates released by CNBS in recent years, the Gini coefficient reached a peak at 49.1 in 2008, 
fell to 48.1 in 2010, 47.7 in 2011, 47.4 in 2012, 47.3 in 2013, 46.9 in 2014, and 46.2 in 2015 (Wan and 
Zhuang 2015; CNBS 2015, 2016). These declines have led some to ask whether the PRC’s income 
inequality has peaked, and whether this vindicates the Kuznets hypothesis which says that a country’s 
income inequality tends to increase at an early stage of development, and peak and then decline when 
the income increases to a certain level.2 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the underlying factors that could explain the recent 
decline in the PRC’s Gini coefficient and ask whether the decline indicates that the income inequality 
has peaked. To answer this question, in section II, the paper provides a brief review of the evolution of 
income inequality in the PRC during the period 1978–2015. Section III constructs a simple conceptual 
framework where key drivers of income inequality can be analyzed. Section IV presents empirical 
evidence on the key drivers and discusses their relevance to explaining the dynamics of inequality in 
the PRC in the last 3–4 decades, including the recent decline. Section V concludes.        
 
 
II. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S INCOME INEQUALITY: 1978–2015 
 
This section pieces together a broad picture of the evolution of income inequality in the PRC during 
1978−2015 using estimates of the Gini coefficient from various sources. Largely due to the public 
unavailability of household survey data covering the entire country, earlier attempts to assess the level 
of income inequality in the PRC focused on the measurement of regional or interhousehold inequality 
in specific locations, such as rural or urban areas, and in specific provinces for specific periods (see Tsui 
1993, Rozelle 1994, Hussain and Zhuang 2000, Kanbur and Zhang 1999). More recently, attempts to 
measure income inequality have also used synthetic unit-level data generated from grouped 
household income and consumption expenditure data covering most provinces (Lin et al. 2010).  
 
Inequality can be measured using per capita income or consumption expenditure. Inequality 
measured by the former is usually higher, in the case of the Gini coefficient, by 5–10 points when 
measured using the range of 0–100 (ADB 2012). Unless otherwise noted, this paper focuses on 
income-based inequality. Table 1 presents eight sets of estimates of the Gini coefficient of per capita 
                                                
1  The Gini coefficient of per capita household income (or consumption) is a commonly used measure of income inequality, 
and it ranges from 0 indicating perfect equality to 100 (or 1) indicating perfect inequality. 
2  Questions have also been raised over the quality of statistical data in the PRC. 
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household income in the PRC in the postreform period, although two sets present problems and will 
not be used further here.3 
 
Table 1: The People’s Republic of China’s Gini Coefficients, 1978–2015 
 
Year 
World 
Development 
Indicatorsa 
Ravallion and Chen (2007) 
WIID 
Chinese 
Household 
Income 
Projectb 
Lin et al. (2010) 
National 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
(NBS) 
Without 
Adjustment 
for Spatial 
COL 
Difference 
With 
Adjustment 
for Spatial 
COL 
Difference 
Without 
Adjustment 
for Spatial 
COL 
Difference 
With 
Adjustment 
for Spatial 
COL 
Difference 
1978 … … … 31.7 … … … …
1979 … … … … … … … …
1980 … … … … … … … …
1981 29.1 31.0 28.0 … … … … …
1982 … 28.5 25.9 … … … … …
1983 … 28.3 26.0 28.4 … … … …
1984 27.7 29.1 26.9 … … … … …
1985 … 29.0 26.5 22.4 … … … …
1986 … 32.4 29.2 … … … … …
1987 29.9 32.4 28.9 … … … … …
1988 … 33.0 29.5 38.2 39.5 … … …
1989 … 35.2 31.8 … … … … …
1990 32.4 34.9 31.6 … … 34.5 28.7 …
1991 … 37.1 33.1 34.1 … … … …
1992 … 39.0 34.2 … … … … …
1993 35.5 42.0 36.7 … … … … …
1994 … 43.3 37.6 … … … … …
1995 … 41.5 36.5 29.0 46.9 39.7 32.9 …
1996 35.7 39.8 35.1 39.0 … … … …
1997 … 39.8 35.0 … … … … …
1998 … 40.3 35.4 … … … … …
1999 39.2 41.6 36.4 … … … … …
2000 … 43.8 38.5 39.0 … 41.1 34.7 …
2001 … 44.7 39.5 … … … … …
2002 42.6 … … 45.4 46.8 … … …
2003 … … … 44.9 … … … 47.9
2004 … … … … … … … 47.3
2005 42.5 … … … … 45.7 38.8 48.5
2006 … … … … … … … 48.7
2007 … … … … 49.7 … … 48.4
2008 42.6 … … … … … … 49.1
2009 … … … … … … … 49.0
2010 42.1 … … … … … … 48.1
2011 … … … … … … … 47.7
2012 … … … … … … … 47.4
2013    47.3
2014    46.9
2015    46.2
… = data not available, COL = cost of living, WIID = World Income Inequality Database. 
a   Based on income (1981–1987) and consumption (1990–2009).  
b  A project of Beijing Normal University. 
Sources:	Wan and Zhuang 2015; CNBS 2015, 2016. 
                                                
3  The World Income Inequality Database set was collected from different publications and may be based on different 
datasets, which could explain why they vary considerably from one year to another. The Gini indexes from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database are inconsistent because post-1989 estimates are consumption based, while the 
earlier estimates are income based. Further, WDI estimates could be biased as they are weighted averages of rural and 
urban estimates, and do not  consider disparities between rural and urban average income or consumption, which have 
been substantial. 
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Among the remaining six sets of estimates, two were obtained by adjusting for spatial cost of 
living (COL) differences. If one compares the spatial COL-adjusted estimates with the corresponding 
unadjusted estimates, the latter are much larger (by 15%–30%). Since most researchers do not 
consider spatial COL differences, we will ignore the two sets of adjusted estimates. However, the 
adjusted and unadjusted estimates share the same trends. 
 
Figure 1 plots estimates from the remaining four sources. These are comparable and all show a 
rising trend of income inequality.4 In particular, the Ravallion and Chen (2007) estimates show that 
income inequality declined at the onset of economic reform until the mid-1980s—due largely to rising 
rural incomes following the rural economic reforms, including the introduction of household 
responsibility system—and since then it has been on the rise amid some fluctuations. 
 
 
Figure 1: Gini Coefficients, 1981–2015
 
 
 
CHIPS = Chinese Household Income Project; CNBS = China National Bureau of 
Statistics. 
Note: Gini coefficients from Ravallion and Chen (2007) and Lin et al. (2010) are in 
nominal terms. 
Sources: Wan and Zhuang 2015; CNBS 2015, 2016. 
 
 
Estimates by CNBS—for recent years—show a more stable trend. Inequality peaked in 2008, 
with a Gini estimate of 49.1, and has since been on the decline, though marginally, each year, reaching 
its lowest recent level at 46.2 in 2015. One can combine the CNBS estimates with those of Ravallion 
and Chen (2007) to form a more complete time series on the PRC’s income inequality. This shows 
that, over a period of 35 years, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient grew by more than 50% 
from 28.3 in 1983 to 49.1 in 2008, and then dipped to 46.2 in 2015. Whether the recent decline 
represents the beginning of the end of worsening income distribution in the PRC—as suggested by the 
Kuznets hypothesis—is still a debated issue. 
 
 
                                                
4  Ravallion and Chen (2007) used data directly provided by the CNBS, while Lin et al. (2010) used CNBS data in grouped 
form. The Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data are piggybacked by a CNBS survey. It is clear that the CHIP 
data estimates are consistently larger and Lin et al. (2010) consistently smaller than all the other estimates. The 
discrepancies can be attributed to the approximation method Lin et al. (2010) used to obtain unit-record data from 
grouped data. The CHIP data have a smaller coverage in sample size than the data used by others. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09 20
11
20
13
20
15
Ravallion and Chen (2005) CHIPS Lin et al. (2010) CNBS
4   |   ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 489 
III. DRIVERS OF INCOME INEQUALITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section presents a simple framework to look at drivers of income inequality, extending ADB 
(2012). The framework is based on the definition of total income of a household, Y, as the sum of its 
income derived from labor and that derived from capital (or wealth): 
 
 ܻ ൌ ܹ	ܮ ൅ ܴ	ܭ (1) 
 
Capital income is the product of the different types of capital assets (K) owned by the 
household and their respective rates of return (R). For a typical household, capital assets consist 
mostly of housing, land, factories and machinery owned by households, and financial assets.5 Labor 
income—which includes returns to human capital—is the product of the different types of labor assets 
(L) and their respective wage rates (W). The return to human capital is reflected in the skill premium, 
that is, the more educated and skilled labor earns higher wages.  
 
Income inequality estimates, such as the Gini coefficient, are often based on per capita 
household income, that is: 
 
 ௒ு ൌ ܹሺ
௅
ுሻ ൅ ܴሺ
௄
ுሻ	  (2) 
 
Therefore, inequality in per capita household income is the result of inequality in per capita 
labor income ሺܹܮ	/ܪ), inequality in per capita capital income (ܴ	ܭ/ܪ), and the relative importance of 
labor and capital incomes in total household income.6 Changes in income inequality can be thought of 
as resulting from a combination of changes in the distributions of per capita labor assets and capital 
assets across households, changes in the relative returns to labor and capital, and changes in the 
relative importance of labor and capital incomes in total household income. 
 
In any society, the distribution of capital assets reflects its ownership structure, while the 
distribution of labor assets is determined to a large extent by the inequality in access to education and 
health. Over time, many factors shape these distributions, including initial distributions, household 
savings behavior and investment decisions, differences in individual efforts and entrepreneurship, 
political economy factors (such as pressures for land redistribution, taxation on labor and capital 
incomes, and public spending on human capital), the quality of governance and institutions, and 
demographics.  
 
Changes in the relative returns to labor and capital reflect demand and supply conditions in the 
marketplace, how efficiently the market works—for instance, the presence or absence of monopoly or 
discrimination against particular population groups (such as females or rural residents), and political 
economy factors (such as labor market institutions and taxation on labor and capital incomes). 
 
Finally, changes in the relative importance of labor and capital incomes in total household 
income are determined by the relative changes in returns to labor and capital and in the capital–labor 
                                                
5  In this paper we use the terms “capital” and “wealth” interchangeably. Capital includes all real and financial assets owned 
by a household, but excludes human capital. A household’s capital incomes include all the incomes from owning various 
capital assets. See discussions in Piketty (2014, 36–38).    
6  Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) decompose the Gini coefficient into the contributions by income source. Each source’s 
contribution to overall inequality is the product of its own Gini coefficient, its share in total income, and its correlation 
with the rank of total income. 
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ratio in production. These are in turn determined by technological advances and the bias of technical 
progress; the relative bargaining positions of labor and capital; political economy factors such as labor 
market institutions (minimum wages, collective bargaining, and employment protection); taxation; and 
the presence or absence of market distortions. 
 
Within this framework, income inequality will increase if changes in relative returns to labor 
and to capital, or in the distribution of labor assets and capital assets, or in the relative importance of 
labor and capital incomes in total income favor the better-off households. There are many ways in 
which this could happen.  
 
First, wage rates could increase faster for the better educated and skilled workers than for the 
less educated and skilled. There is a large literature showing that globalization and technological 
progress may have increased the demand for skilled workers relative to that for unskilled workers in 
many developing countries, leading to an increasing skill premium (ADB 2012). In the case of the PRC, 
the market-oriented reforms introduced since the late 1970s dismantled the fixed-wage system that 
existed under central planning, and have made wages more reflective of workers’ skills and educational 
attainments and of market demand and supply conditions, and have also contributed to the increase in 
the skill premium, as evidenced by rising wage inequality (Knight and Song 2003, Deng and Li 2009). 
 
Second, the differentials in the returns to capital and in wage rates between Chinese richer 
coastal and urban areas and the poorer interior and rural areas could increase as growth accelerated, 
leading to increasing spatial inequality. This is because coastal regions are closer to trade routes and 
world markets than interior regions; and because urban cities have better infrastructure than rural 
areas, they are more likely to attract investment and new technologies, especially during the initial 
phase of growth takeoff (Lewis 1954). All these could lead to greater increases in productivity, wages 
and returns to capital in the favored areas. Land and housing prices have increased much faster in 
coastal areas and urban cities than in inland provinces and rural areas in the PRC in the last 40 years or 
so.  
 
Third, capital income could increase faster than labor income. This would lead to a rising share 
of capital income in total household income (which tends to be less equally distributed) and a declining 
share of labor income (which tends to be more equally distributed). This occurs when total income 
grows faster than labor income (or when per capita income grows faster than the wage rate), leaving a 
larger share of value added accruing to capital. It has been suggested that technological progress 
especially in information and communications technology and automation may have reduced the 
demand for labor relative to that for capital, as shown by a declining employment elasticity of growth in 
recent decades in many countries, thus favoring capital (ADB 2012). In the case of the PRC, the large 
pool of rural surplus labor has also put downward pressure on wage rates until recently (Knight, Deng, 
and Li 2011).     
 
Fourth, increasing inequality in the distribution of human capital (embedded in labor) or capital 
(or wealth) can also lead to an increase in income inequality. Inequality in human capital could increase 
if wealthier households invest more on or have better access to education and health than poorer 
households. Inequality in wealth could increase if wealthier households save more, if they receive 
higher returns to capital due to economies of scale or if they have lower fertility rates than less-wealthy 
households. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
This section provides empirical evidence on the major drivers of rising income inequality in the PRC in 
recent decades, focusing on skill premium, share of capital income in national income, spatial 
inequality, and wealth distribution. Although distribution of human capital is also highly relevant in our 
framework, due to the lack of data, it is not included in the empirical analysis below.  
 
A. Skill Premium 
 
In many countries, wage inequality is often a major contributor to inequality of income. In Asia, 
empirical studies find that returns to education increase with educational attainment and that the 
relationship has been getting stronger over time in recent years. An ADB study finds that from the mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s, real wages grew much faster for wage earners with tertiary or higher 
education than for those with lower educational attainment in India and the Philippines, leading to 
wider wage differentials (Zhuang, Kanbur, and Rhee 2014). In India, the Gini coefficient of wages 
increased from 40.5 in 1993 to 47.2 in 2004 and about 50% of the increases was accounted for by 
education. Many studies provide direct evidence of rising skill and education premiums in Asia (World 
Bank 2012).  
 
Returns to education have also risen in the PRC in the postreform period (Zhang et al. 2005, 
Liu 2009). The World Bank (2012) estimates that the tertiary education premium was 60% in 2005 
and increased across sectors in recent years. Household survey data show the growing importance of 
educational status in explaining interhousehold income inequality. Sicular et al. (2008) find that 
education can explain more than 25% of the PRC’s urban–rural income gap. The ADB (2012) finds 
that, based on survey data, the share of income inequality accounted for by differences in educational 
attainment of heads of households increased from 8.1% in 1995 to 26.5% in 2007 (Figure 2). The study 
also finds that the importance of education in explaining household incomes has risen in many other 
Asian countries as well, such as Bhutan, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, the 
increase was most pronounced in the PRC.  
 
More recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that the increase in skill premium may have 
slowed down or the level of skill premium may have decreased in the PRC. Assuming that the wage 
levels above the national average correspond to jobs requiring high skills, and that those below the 
national average correspond to jobs requiring low skills, recent data show that wages in high-skill 
sectors are now rising at a slower pace than wages in low-skill sectors (Figure 3). During 2004–2009, 
with the exception of 2008, the average wage growth was faster for high-skill sectors than low-skill 
sectors. Since 2009, however, the average wage growth has been faster for low-skill sectors than for 
high-skill sectors. In 2011, for example, the average wage growth for low-skill sectors was close to 20%, 
while that for high-skill sectors was only about 14%.  
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Figure 2: Income Inequality Decomposition 
by Educational Attainment of Household Head,  
Selected Countries 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: Estimates are based on per capita consumption expenditure in nominal 
terms except for the PRC, which is based on income. The decomposition is based 
on GE(0), which is a special form of the generalized entropy index. 
Source: Asian Development Bank 2012. 
 
Figure 3: Nominal Wage Growth of Low-Skill and High-
Skill Sectors in the People’s Republic of China,  
2004–2014 
 
 
Notes:  
1. Low-skill sectors: agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery; 
manufacturing; construction; wholesale and retail trades; hotels and catering 
services; management of water conservancy, environment, and public facilities; 
services to households, repair, and other services. 
2. High-skill sectors: mining; production and supply of electricity, heat, gas, and 
water; transport, storage, and post; information transmission, software, and 
information technology; financial intermediation; real estate; leasing and business 
services; scientific research and technical services; education; health and social 
service; culture, sports, and entertainment; public management, social security, and 
social organization. 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics. http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
(accessed 16 April 2016). 
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One possible reason for the declining skill premium in the PRC in recent years is a rapid 
increase in the investment in tertiary education. The annual university enrollment increased from 0.93 
million in 1995 to 6.62 million in 2010, and it has been reported that many university graduates find it 
difficult to find suitable jobs in recent years, leading to high unemployment among these graduates 
(Chan 2015; Knight, Deng, and Li 2016). This may have put downward pressures on wage rates for the 
better-educated labor. Another possible reason is rapid increases in the minimum wage rates (Li and 
Lin 2015). During 2010–2014, the average monthly minimum wage rate in coastal provinces, 
applicable mostly to low-skilled workers, grew by 56.2%, and the average wage rate of the urban 
nonprivate sector, applicable mostly to high-skilled workers, grew only by 54.2% (CNBS, China 
Statistical Yearbook). 
 
B. Shares of Labor and Capital Incomes 
 
A decline in the share of labor income (with the consequent increase in the share of capital income) in 
national income can increase income inequality because, in general, labor income is more equally 
distributed than capital income. During the last 2 decades, many countries, both developed and 
developing, saw the income share of labor fall. In the United States, this share declined from 65% in 
1992 to 52.4% in 2009 in industry (Figure 4), and, for the entire economy and during the same period, 
it fell from 68.7% to 64.2%. In Germany, the share increased from the mid-1980s until 1993, when it 
peaked at 79.5%, but has declined since then. 
 
Figure 4: Labor Income Share of Industry, Selected 
Developed Countries, 1980–2010 
 
 
Note: The annual labor income share is calculated as total labor cost in nominal 
terms divided by nominal output. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD.Stat 
Extract (accessed March 2012). 
 
In the PRC, Bai and Qian (2009) find that the share of labor income in the manufacturing 
sector fell from 48.4% in the mid-1990s to 42.2% in the mid-2000s. An ADB study (2012) shows that 
many other Asian economies also experienced a falling share of labor income, including India; 
Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China. However, more recent data 
suggests that the share of labor income in the PRC’s manufacturing sector has started rising, from 
46.4% in 2005 to 53.9% in 2010, and 55.3% in 2012 (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Shares of Labor and Capital Incomes 
in Manufacturing Value Added  
(% of total) 
 
 
Notes: Labor income share = remuneration of employees / (manufacturing gross 
value added - net production tax); Capital income share = (operating surplus + 
depreciation of fixed asset) / (manufacturing gross value added - net production tax).  
Source: CEIC Data Company, Global Database (from the PRC input–output table, 
accessed 18 April 2016). 
 
Many have argued that the PRC is approaching the so-called “Lewis turning point” where the 
pool of rural surplus labor has shrunk to the extent that further rural migration to cities would require 
greater wage increases, leading to labor market tightening in urban areas. This is consistent with the 
fact that Chinese coastal provinces have been experiencing labor shortages since the mid-2000s 
(ADB 2012). However, it has also been noted that the increase in the labor income share was partly 
due to redefining labor income share by the CNBS; some implicit subsidies and government spending 
on welfare programs have now been reclassified as a part of labor income, which was not in the 
previous statistics (Li, Wan, and Zhuang 2014). 
 
C. Spatial Inequality 
 
Increasing spatial inequality, covering both urban–rural income gaps and interprovincial disparities, has 
been particularly important as a channel by which technological progress, integration with the global 
economy, and market-oriented reform impact income distribution in the PRC. Just as the distribution 
of economic activity is structured geographically, so is the distribution of income. Some locations have 
natural advantages, such as fertile soil for agriculture or proximity to a coastline for trade or better 
infrastructure in cities. Economic analysis has also highlighted the role of agglomeration benefits 
(Krugman 2008). According to an ADB study (2012), in 2007, more than 50% of income inequality in 
the PRC can be explained by the spatial inequality, the highest among Asian countries with 
comparative data (Figure 6). 
 
The increasing urban–rural income gap is a particularly significant contributor to rising 
inequality in the PRC. Using synthetic unit-level data estimated from the grouped household income 
and consumption expenditure data covering 85% of the population and updating estimates of Lin et al. 
(2010), it is found that the share of between–urban–rural inequality in total income inequality 
increased from about 20% in 1990 to 32% in 2008 after adjusting household income by differences in 
the cost of living between urban and rural areas (Figure 7). During the same period, the share of within-
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share of the between–urban–rural inequality increased from 34% in 1990 to 45% in 2008. The ADB 
study (2012) shows that the PRC is not the only country in Asia that experienced rising urban–rural 
income gaps in the last 2 decades. 
 
Figure 6: Contribution of Spatial Inequality to Overall 
Inequality, Selected Asian Countries 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Note: Spatial inequality covers both between-region and urban–rural inequality. 
The estimation is arrived at by dividing all sample households into groups classified 
by both region and urban–rural. For example, if a country has 20 provinces, the 
total groups will be 40 (20 urban and 20 rural). The between-group inequality is 
the combined spatial inequality. 
Source: Asian Development Bank 2012. 
 
However, recent data suggest that urban–rural income gap in the PRC has started decline in 
recent years. The urban–rural ratio of the mean per capita household disposable income was on the 
rise consistently from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s. But it has been on the decline more recently, from 
3.33 in 2007 to 2.9 in 2015 (Figure 8). Despite statistical issues related to these figures that have often 
been raised (such as the definition of rural and urban households and the treatment of rural migrants), 
the trend shows a consistent decrease in the ratio in recent years.  
 
Figure 7: Interhousehold Income Inequality 
Decomposition, Urban–Rural, 1990–2008 
 
 
Note: Household income is adjusted by differences in the cost of living between 
urban and rural areas. 
Source: Authors’ estimates updating Lin et al. (2010). 
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A number of factors could explain this decline in urban–rural income gap. Large migration from 
rural to urban areas reduces rural surplus labor and helps improve labor productivity of farming. Rapid 
pace of urbanization also helps reduce urban–rural income gaps. Recent government policy actions in 
supporting rural peasants (such as investment in rural infrastructure, improvement in social security, 
and antipoverty programs) have also contributed to increasing rural income and declining urban–rural 
income gaps (Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013).  
 
Figure 8: The Ratio of Urban–Rural per Capita 
Household Disposable Income, 1980–2015 
 
 
 
Note: Urban households refer to per capita disposable household income and rural 
households refer to per capita net income. 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics. http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
(accessed 18 April 2016). 
 
The other dimension of spatial inequality is regional inequality, which has also been a key 
contributor to rising inequality in the PRC. During 1990–2003, the Gini coefficient of per capita 
provincial income increased more or less concurrently with the overall national Gini coefficient. 
However, since 2003, regional inequality has been on the decline (Figure 9). Some studies attribute 
this to the Great Western Development Strategy (Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 2011). Decomposition 
analysis shows that the contribution of between-province inequality to total inequality remained stable 
at about 10% in 1990 and in 2008 (ADB 2012).  
 
Figure 9: Gini Coefficient of Provincial per Capita 
Incomes, 1990–2014 
 
 
Note: Gini coefficients are weighted by group population. 
Source: Authors’ estimates using CEIC Data Company, Global Database (accessed 
19 April 2016). 
 
1980, 2.5
1990, 2.2
2007, 3.3
2015, 2.9
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
197
8
19
80 19
82
19
84
19
86 19
88
19
90 19
92
19
94
19
96 19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Ur
ba
n/
ru
ral
 ra
tio
 
1990, 20.9
1996, 24.7
2003, 27.3
2014, 20.4
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
19
90 19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
12   |   ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 489 
D. Wealth Distribution 
 
Wealth distribution is usually more unequal than income distribution. Rising wealth inequality has likely 
also been a major contributor to the rising income inequality in the PRC, although it has not been studied 
as extensively as income inequality because of the data limitation. A recent study by Li and Wan (2015) 
find that wealth distribution has become more and more unequal in the PRC. For the PRC as a whole, the 
wealth Gini coefficient increased from 34 in 1988 to 73 in 2012 (Figure 10). For urban PRC, it increased 
from about 50 in the mid-1990s to 63 in 2010. For rural PRC, it increased from 31 in 1988 to 71 in 2010. A 
major contributing factor to the rising wealth distribution has been rising housing prices.  
 
Figure 10: Gini Coefficient of per Capita Net Household 
Wealth, 1988–2012 
 
 
Source: Li and Wan 2015. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION: HAS THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S INCOME INEQUALITY 
PEAKED? 
 
The previous section shows that rising skill premium, declining share of labor income and rising share of 
capital income, widening urban–rural income gap and regional inequality, and increasing wealth 
inequality have been among key drivers of rising income inequality in the PRC in recent decades. But 
many of these drivers appear to have reversed their directions more recently. Empirical data show that, 
in recent years, skill premium has declined, the share of labor income has been on the rise and capital 
income on the decline, and urban–urban income gaps and regional inequality have fallen, and these 
may have been underlying factors contributing to the decline in the PRC’s overall income inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient since 2008. 
 
Has the PRC’s income inequality peaked, as suggested by the Kuznets hypothesis? For the 
following reasons, we believe that it is premature to think that the PRC’s inequality has peaked. 
 
First, much of the recent reverse of the drivers of the PRC’s income inequality is policy induced. 
For instance, falling skill premium may have been due to the large government investment in tertiary 
education in recent years, as well as government measures to increase minimum wages for low-skilled 
workers. Falling regional inequality is partly due to the implementation of the Great Western 
Development Strategy since 2000. Narrowing urban–rural gaps are also partly related to the 
government’s policy actions to promote urbanization and improve rural incomes and social protection 
in rural areas. While increasing labor income share may have been associated with the approaching of 
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the Lewis turning point, it has also something to do with the rising minimum wages set by many 
provincial governments. The fact that there are still more than 200 million people working in the 
agriculture sector means that labor market situation could change, especially when the PRC’s growth 
slows down. For all these reasons, policies for reducing inequality should continue if inequality is to be 
reduced further. 
 
Second, inequality in wealth distribution has continued to increase in the PRC, and could be a 
new major source of rising income inequality in the PRC. 
 
Third, although Kuznets hypothesized that income inequality will first increase, then peak, and 
then decline as a country’s income level increases, empirical testing of the Kuznets hypothesis has so 
far yielded mixed results. Recent experiences of the developed countries—many of which saw rising 
inequality in the last 2–3 decades—have put another shadow over the validity of the Kuznets 
hypothesis. More importantly, one of the underlying factors for the inverted-U hypothesis is that as a 
country becomes more advanced, the rising middle class will demand for greater income redistribution 
through taxation and public spending (Kuznets 1955). This suggests the importance of public policy in 
containing and reducing income inequality.  
 
Figure 11: Income Inequality in OECD Countries
 
 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Source:  Asian Development Bank 2012. 
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In most OECD countries, while posttax and posttransfer Gini coefficients that are based in per 
capita disposable income are low, in the range of 25–35, their pretax and pretransfer Gini coefficients 
that are based in per capita market income are not low, mostly in the range of 40–50, about one-third 
higher (Figure 11). The PRC’s current Gini coefficient of per capita household disposable income, as 
shown in Figure 1, is within this range. Li, Wan, and Zhuang (2014) and Zhan and Li (2016) show that 
income redistribution plays a very limited role in reducing income inequality in the PRC. In 2009, the 
pretax urban Gini coefficient was 34.7 and posttax Gini coefficient was 33.5, only slightly lower; in 
2013, the two were 38.5 and 37.3, respectively (Table 2). 
 
The limited role of personal income taxes in reducing income inequality in the PRC is 
consistent with the fact that, as recently as 2013, the country’s total personal income tax revenue only 
amounted to about 1.5% of gross domestic product. This suggests that the future path of the PRC’s 
income inequality may not be one directional, and reducing income inequality significantly may require 
personal income tax and transfers to play a greater role over time. 
 
Table 2: Pretax and Posttax Urban Gini Coefficient,  
People’s Republic of China 
 
Year Pretax Gini Posttax Gini 
1997 30.1 29.6
2002 32.5 31.8
2005 35.2 34.2
2008 36.3 35.1
2009 34.7 33.5
2013 38.5 37.3
Sources: Li, Wan, and Zhuang 2014;  Zhan and Li 2016. 
 
In sum, the recent decline in income inequality in the PRC as measured by the Gini coefficient 
is encouraging. But part of the decline is policy induced, and there is no guarantee that the decline will 
continue in the absence of these policies. It is therefore important for the PRC to continue its efforts in 
reducing income inequality by creating more opportunities for a wider section of the population and 
making greater use of fiscal policy to equalize access to opportunities, including greater public 
spending on education, health care, and social protection, especially for rural population; and more 
effective and fairer personal income taxes. The government has recently indicated that personal 
income tax reform will be a priority under its 13th Five-Year Plan during 2016–2020 (China Daily 
2016). 
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